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USA PUSHES MISSILE DEFENCE

The history of the development of US systems for the interception of incoming long-range ballistic missiles dates back to 1958 following entry into service of the intercontinental missile (ICM) R-7 in the Soviet Union and launch of the first Sputniks. However, the first anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system with the Nike Zeus interceptor missiles proved unreliable and never reached the production stage.

An upgraded variant from 1963 envisaged that enemy missiles would be intercepted by short-range Sprint missiles and destroyed within the atmosphere using nuclear warheads. However, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty outlawing the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere together with the not unfounded assumption that installation of the system could lead to an arms race with the Soviet Union, led to cancellation of the project.

In 1967 a national missile defence system known as Sentinel was planned to enter service, but this too had to be abandoned, not least due to wide-scale opposition from the American people: the missiles were located too close to the urban centres that they were intended to protect, automatically turning them into targets for an enemy power.

Two years later the ABM system Safeguard was designed to protect twelve of the most important military centres, but signing of the ABM treaty in 1970 reduced the number of such systems from 1974 to only one. The Russians installed their system around Moscow while the USA considered its missile silos in North Dakota important enough to need protection. But just one day after the system had entered service on 1 October 1975 the US administration decided to dismantle the missiles again because they could not guarantee effective protection and were also too expensive.

In 1983 President Reagan then launched his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly known as "Star Wars", which was intended to erect an impermeable protective shield around the USA. As well as interceptor missiles, numerous reconnaissance, communications and killer satellites were planned, while in addition space-based nuclear laser sources and laser battle stations were to be developed and stationed in orbit. Escalating costs, enormous technical problems and, above all, a wave of international protest resulted in this project being laid to rest as well.

With the demise of the Soviet Union and its satellite states, SDI was apparently shelved. The most powerful enemy of the West no longer existed. But without an enemy to focus on, the US armaments programmes, the billions of dollars being spent on new weapons and the millions of troops stationed at bases throughout the world lose their justification. And so it was not long before the politicians, defence industry lobbyists and the Pentagon strategists had come up with their new arch enemy - international terrorism in the form of "rogue states".

Any country which does not choose to bend to the political or economic dictates of the self-appointed world policing agent has a good chance of being added promptly to this list. However, the prime candidates for inclusion on the list are those countries which themselves have the capability to develop military missiles and hence are viewed as potential aggressors.

The primary states singled out by the US intelligence services are India, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea and Syria. These countries already have either their own or Russian systems, a prime example of which are the Scud missiles that were used in the Gulf War. Although it is true that these missiles have a range of only 300km, it is assumed that the countries which deploy them are working feverishly on more advanced programmes. To date the CIA has failed to provide any proof of its assertions. China, Pakistan and Russia, on the other hand, are not classified directly amongst the "rogue states" but are being monitored as special cases.

It is interesting to know that the Strategic Defense Initiative organisation was never disbanded, as one might have assumed was the case at the beginning of the 1990s. Silently and covertly it had merely change its name, to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organisation (BMDO), to ensure that the money spent at that point would not have been in vain. Some $122 billion has been spent to date on missile defence systems of all types. None of them has achieved its declared objective, and some of them have even violated international treaties that were in force.

After the Iraqis fired Scud missiles at Israel during the Gulf War it was no longer necessary to cover things up, and the new National Missile Defense (NMD) system was quite openly proclaimed. The NMD is to comprise several different types of BMD system, some of which are already available from the days of SDI while others still have to be developed and put into service.

These include, for example, an upgraded Patriot missile with a range of 600 to 1500km, the sea-based Navy Area Defense and Navy Theater Wide interception systems, the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) mobile medium-range missile system, the land-based Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system for intercepting missile at altitudes above 40km, air and space-based laser weapons and numerous early warning and reconnaissance stations which are to be expanded through a solid network of combat, reconnaissance and communications satellites.

The decision to proceed with NMD was made in 1999: the US congress forced President Clinton to approve NMD provided that the technical preconditions for the system could be met. Clinton imposed the condition that there must be at least three successful test firings of the new missiles - something which to this day has not been achieved. Thus, for example, because the planned platform system was not working, modified Minuteman missiles had to be used as the interceptor missiles, while other components were not available at all due to numerous technical problems and therefore could only be simulated on the computer.

Although the data gained was obviously doctored and also materially embellished, the companies involved in building NMD have a good chance now that President George W. Bush has been elected of being able to continue work on the programme despite all the problems. He made it quite clear shortly after he took office that they planned to install the system despite all the protests, even from the Americans' allies in NATO.

Despite its huge cost, once the system is installed it will only be able to destroy a maximum of 20 warheads, whereas Russia on its own is capable of deploying up to 500 missiles simultaneously. And as for the short- and medium-range missiles of the "rogue states", NMD offers no protection against them as it is not actually being built with the aim of protecting against these.

Given that today it is standard for a missile to have multiple warheads and it is also quite feasible to install decoys in the missiles, NMD would be overstretched as early as the first attack. For example, if one were to put genuine warheads and dummies in shells coated with a reflective layer, the NMD surveillance systems would be unable to distinguish between them. Even the familiar chaff used in the Second World War would be capable of neutralising the defensive sensors, and simple nitrogen cooling of the missiles would prevent the infra-red sensors of the killer satellites from responding. Rapid rotation or reflective coating of the warheads would in turn deny the beams from the laser battle stations a possible point of attack, especially as no one has yet explained from where the latter are to obtain the vast amounts of energy they will need to attack the approaching missiles.

The history of previous missile defence systems and the record so far on development of today's systems both suggest there is little likelihood of achieving a functional space defence system this time either. Moreover, between now and 2005 there is to be only a single attempt at interception, and under the best possible conditions as well - the Americans will not have gained much in the way of defensive cover despite all the billions that will have been spent by then.

From page 50 of FLUG REVUE 6/2001