FLUG REVUE January 2004: Safety and security challenges

AIR SAFETY SHOULD NOT PAY THE PRICE OF SECURITY MEASURES

By Volker K. Thomalla

Security and safety are two unrelated terms which, interestingly, are both rendered by a single word, “Sicherheit”, in German. Whereas in the context of air travel “safety” refers to air safety in the technical and operational sense, “security” relates to the protection of air traffic against external influences such as hijackings. Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, security has acquired a degree of importance hitherto unknown. Many processes and objects are now subordinate to security, including in Europe. The new EU directive on security at airports that will shortly enter into force is a testimony to the primacy of security. Managers of small airports in particular are shaking their heads at the prospect of the instructions that they are now expected to implement.

Without any doubt security must be applied in such a way that misuse of aircraft by criminals or terrorists and attacks on aircraft are prevented as far as possible. That this should result in constraints on passenger convenience in the form of security checks at airport gates is understandable, and as such acceptable. But when security starts to impact air safety, it is time to start thinking about other ways of achieving the security objectives.

After 9/11 the cockpit doors of commercial aircraft were strengthened so that forced entry into the cockpit by outsiders was impossible. From the security point of view this is sensible and necessary, but from a safety point of view it is not. The doors constrain communication between passenger cabin and cockpit. Without intercom or onboard telephones it is no longer possible for cabin and cockpit crew to communicate with each other, at least in widebody aircraft.

In an emergency this means that valuable time is lost. In the past there have been many instances of emergencies in aviation in which human lives were only saved through the courageous intervention of third parties. One example is the case of the BAC One Eleven which suddenly lost an incorrectly installed cockpit window in transit between Spain and England. The co-pilot had already been half sucked out when a flight attendant managed to grab him and hold on to him until the aircraft landed. With reinforced cockpit doors the consequences of this incident would very likely have been more dramatic.

Again, smooth communication between flight attendants and cockpit crew is essential during the emergency evacuation of an aircraft. The security doors prevent this communication. When an emergency strikes in the air, no pilot has time to get out of his seat to open the cockpit door from inside. There is a need for action in this area; safety and security experts must work together to arrive at reasonable solutions.

There is no such thing as absolute security or absolute safety, nor will there ever be. The balance between security and safety is not simple, but even after 9/11 security should not automatically be made a higher priority than safety. The two must be interwoven sensibly to ensure that aviation as a whole remains safe.

From page 4 of FLUG REVUE 1/2004

Last updated 9 December 2003

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