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NO GROWTH WITHOUT SECURITY

By Volker K. Thomalla

The attacks of 11 September in the USA showed how easy it was to circumvent security systems in air transport. Legislators, airports, airlines and manufacturers across the world are attempting to close up the security loopholes that allowed the events of 11 September to take place with a raft of measures and new regulations.

All those involved are working close together, no doubt recognising that air safety, and with it passenger confidence, cannot be restored through isolated measures, but only through a new security concept organised on a far wider scale than it was in the past.

This security will cost money. One of the most important questions will be who is to pay the additional costs. Should they be borne by the airlines, the state, for example in the form of an enhanced police presence at airports, or by the airports? Ultimately it is likely to be the passengers who will have to reach deeper into their pockets in the future to pay for peace of mind than in the past. The precise mechanism by which they pay - through higher ticket prices, a flight security fee or higher taxes - is irrelevant here.

Two basic approaches are being put forward as a means of raising on-board security in commercial air transport: technical solutions and preventive measures that affect both ground and on board operations.

One of the security weaknesses identified was the fact that airport staff who move around on the ramp and are allowed to approach the aircraft are not basically subjected to any security vetting. This will now change, since it is still not clear how the knives which the terrorists used on 11 September got on board the aircraft. It is possible that they had accomplices at the airport or working for the airlines, who had smuggled the weapons into the secure areas.

After it became known that one of the hijackers had purchased a Swiss pen-knife, an immediate measure was introduced at all airports banning passengers from carrying knives and pointed objects such as nail files and nail scissors. The old rules, under which knives with a blade length of up to 10 cm were allowed to pass through the security checks unchallenged, were incomprehensible, as such a knife can actually be transformed into a fatal weapon if one knows how to use it.

The fact that checks are not carried out at airports as to whether the person carrying an identity card is also its owner has also come under fire. Here, suggested ways of improving the security situation include technical solutions such as access controls at airports, by means of which the eyes or fingerprints of employees would be checked whenever access was sought to a restricted area.

After 11 September, some of the airlines followed the example of the Israeli carrier, El Al, in sending armed "sky marshals" on selected flights. In Germany this function is performed by officials from the Federal Border Guard. The US Federal Aviation Authority advertised on its website for candidates for this new role and within a few days it had been overwhelmed with thousands of enquiries.

The sky marshals accompany flights anonymously, i.e. they check in with all the other passengers and have a normal ticket, but they are armed. Often the crew of the aircraft concerned do not known that such security officers are on board. Details regarding the weapons carried by and training given to sky marshals are of course secret. There has been discussion of equipment involving heavy stun guns which immobilise potential attackers and of pistols armed with rubber bullets which cannot penetrate through the cabin walls of the aircraft. Handcuffs and cable straps to tie up violent criminals were carried by some airlines, but not all, already before 11 September, as cases of passengers ready to resort to violence have dramatically increased over the last ten years.

The task of the sky marshals is not only to intervene during a real hijack but above all to act as a deterrent to potential terrorists. At the same time it is hoped that the presence of sky marshals will restore some of the lost passenger confidence in the safety of air travel.

One technical measure mooted for the future prevention of hijacking is to strengthen the cockpit doors to prevent intrusion into the cockpit by unauthorised persons. However, there are technical problems with this solution, since on the one hand cockpit doors will need to be constructed in such a way that they can withstand ramming with a service trolley weighing up to 130 kg, while on the other hand it must be possible to equalise the pressure between cockpit and cabin in the event of a sudden loss of pressure in the cabin. Since around 10,000 passenger aircraft are in service world-wide, this will result in a lucrative upgrade market whose volume is estimated by experts at up to $2 billion. In the meantime, to tide them over between now and such an upgrade, some airlines are reinforcing their doors with extra bolts and new hinges. Airlines are not publishing any details of how they are protecting their doors. "We do not want to give potential terrorists the key to overcoming the strengthening measures we have adopted," was the justification given to FLUG REVUE by one spokesman.

Until recently, pilots' unions were vigorously objecting to video monitoring of cockpit and cabin. The events of 11 September have changed their minds on this point. British Airways is the first airline to have gone public with the announcement that it was thinking of introducing video monitoring on board the aircraft. David Hyde, Director of Safety at BA, said, "It was very important for us to act quickly after 11 September. But we didn't want to rush into anything. We need to adopt measures to counter the events of 11 September effectively but which will be sustainable in the long-term." He went on to say that BA spends over DM 300 million per year on security and that BA's security measures are regularly reviewed internally by specialists.

American pilots want to be armed in the future. They have advocated that the crew should be allowed to carry hand-weapons in the cockpit so that they can defend themselves in an emergency. They refer to the case of a Federal Express crew who were attacked by a sacked FedEx employee who wanted to fly the freighter into the headquarters of the company. The man had smuggled a harpoon and a hammer on board with him and seriously injured the crew with these weapons after take-off. It was only the resolute dedication of the two pilots who, despite being seriously injured, overcame the hijacker after a physical struggle and then kept him under control, that prevented him from accomplishing his plan.

Up to then it had been assumed in all the hijack scenarios that human lives could be saved by giving in to the demands of the hijackers. The events of 11 September have changed the way hijacks are perceived. Even representatives of passenger associations are therefore advocating self-help by passengers as a last resort if all the other pieces in the new security chain have failed. Once it is apparent that the aircraft is being hijacked, passengers should no longer sit quietly but take the initiative to overcome the terrorists. If fanatical criminals have decided to kill themselves and the passengers of an aircraft anyway, it is necessary and legitimate, they argue, that passengers should take action against them in concert with the crew, even at the cost of their own lives.

The new security situation has also left its mark on the airlines' route networks. Thus, for example, since 11 September BA has changed the route flown on six Asian flights so that they will no longer come into contact with Afghan airspace.

Each individual security measure may be surmountable in one or other aspect, but together they should provide a security network in which potential plane hijackers and terrorists are caught.

From page 22 of FLUG REVUE 12/2001